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Abstract
This paper discusses some aspects of the centralised version of the sup-
ply chain coordination method that uses the so-called Alternating Direction
Method (ADM) presented by Jeong (2012, A centralized/decentralized de-
sign of a full return contract for a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral
retailer under partial information sharing. International Journal of Produc-
tion Economics, 136(1), 110–115). We show that the method requires both
from the retailer and the manufacturer to faithfully follow the proposed al-
gorithm, without any attempt to follow their own interests in gaining higher
profits. We also warn that the condition of the information privacy is vio-
lated also in partial information sharing model. Furthermore, we correct an
error in one of the equations.
Keywords: Supply chain coordination, Alternating Direction Method,
Information sharing
1. Introduction and problem statement
Jeong (2012) studies the newsvendor problem with a full return contract,
where the retailer has to determine order quantity Q, while the demand Y
is stochastic variable characterised by the cumulative distribution function
F (·). The manufacturer produces the quantity Q at unit price m, and sells it
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to the retailer on wholesale price c per unit. The retailer can sell min{Q, Y }
at retail price p and can return the remaining max{Q− Y, 0} at rebate price
r to the manufacturer. The decision variables of the model are Q and r.
The expected profits are
GRFR(Q, r) = (p− c)Q− (p− r)
∫ Q
0
F (y)dy, (1)
GMFR(Q, r) = (c−m)Q− r
∫ Q
0
F (y)dy, and (2)
GFR(Q, r) = GRFR(Q, r) + GMFR(Q, r) = (p−m)Q− p
∫ Q
0
F (y)dy (3)
for the retailer, the manufacturer and the supply chain, respectively. The au-
thor assumes a risk-free manufacturer, that means the manufacturer should
obtain profit at least as high as without the return contract. This leads to
the following constraint
r = (c−m)
(
1− Q
∗
RNR
Q
)
, (4)
where Q∗RNR is the optimal order quantity without possible returns, i.e., it
maximises GRFR(Q, 0).
The author defines coordination as: “a supply chain is said to be coor-
dinated if the expected profit of the supply chain is maximised”. In this
discussion I focus exclusively on this coordination problem, i.e., the cen-
tralised full return contract design problem under partial information sharing
(CFRP). The solution of the presented problem is difficult, since the p price
is known only by the retailer, while m is known only by the manufacturer.
The demand distribution is also indicated to be private information of the
retailer, although, as it is stated in Section 4.3, it must be shared truthfully.
Note that truthful sharing of forecasts is a challenging task in itself, see e.g.,
Egri and Va´ncza (2012).
For the distributed solution of this problem, the author proposes the Al-
ternating Direction Method (AMD), where the retailer and the manufacturer
iteratively exchange proposals and counter-proposals (Q1, r1) and (Q2, r2),
respectively. According to this method, the retailer and the manufacturer
should maximise
LRFR(Q1, r1) = GRFR(Q1, r1)− L(r1, r2, Q1, Q2), and (5)
2
LMFR(Q2, r2) = GMFR(Q2, r2)− L(r1, r2, Q1, Q2) (6)
respectively, where
L(r1, r2, Q1, Q2) = u(r1−r2)+v(Q1−Q2)+0.5(r1−r2)2+0.5(Q1−Q2)2. (7)
I.e., they maximise their profits minus a Lagrangian term penalising r1 6= r2
and Q1 6= Q2. The method guarantees convergence to the optimal solution
of GFR(Q, r).
2. Discussion
Firstly, let us correct the error in Eq. (19):
∂LMFR
Q2
= c−m− (c−m)
{
Q∗RNR
Q22
∫ Q2
0
F (y)dy + (1− Q
∗
RNR
Q2
)F (Q2)
}
+v(t) + Q1(t)−Q2 = 0. (8)
Since r2 depends on Q2, it does not vanish during the derivation, therefore
the previous equation should include
(c−m)
(
(u(t) + r1(t + 1))
Q∗RNR
Q22
− (c−m)(1− Q
∗
RNR
Q2
)
Q∗RNR
Q22
)
, (9)
on the left hand side, c.f. Eq. (15) which correctly contains this term. There
is also an error in Fig. 6. and 7.: since the definition of Q1, r1 and the initial
parameters are the same as in Example 1, Q1(1) and r1(1) should be same
as on Fig. 4. and 5., i.e., 52.5 and 0, respectively. Moreover, the curves
should be similar to the curves presented on Fig. 4. and 5., but converging
to Q∗ = 50 and r∗ = 12.5.
As for the partial information sharing, the author states that “the re-
tailer and the manufacturer do not want to reveal complete private informa-
tion”. Although in the proposed protocol they do not directly reveal their
private information, after computing the optimal contract parameters, they
can derive each other’s price and cost parameters. When they obtain the
optimal Q∗ and r∗ values that maximise GFR(Q, r), the retailer can compute
m = p(1−F (Q∗)), while the manufacturer can determine p = m/(1−F (Q∗)),
thus the information privacy is violated. Furthermore, the manufacturer
should know Q∗RNR according to the presented ADM protocol, and therefore
can obtain p = c/(1−F (Q∗RNR)) even before the termination of the method.
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Finally, we point out a weakness of an ADM-based protocol, namely
that it assumes that the manufacturer and the retailer agree on maximising
the total supply chain profit and they follow the prescribed steps faithfully.
That means that they should not maximise their own profits, but their profits
minus a Lagrangian penalty. In our opinion, this assumption is not clearly
stated anywhere in Jeong (2012), thus a careless reader may think that the
protocol works with a self-interested retailer and manufacturer, too. The
next counterexample would like to demonstrate that this is not the case, the
participants may untruthfully state that they agree on maximizing the total
supply chain profit, but they cheat in order to increase their own profits.
It is possible that they do not consider the Lagrangian term, or consider it
with smaller weight in order to increase their own profits. In such a case, the
method does not coordinate the chain any more (in the sense of total profit
maximisation). Let us show this in case of Example 2 of Jeong (2012). If the
correct method is executed, it converges to the optimal Q∗ = 50 and r∗ =
12.5, which results in GRFR(Q
∗, r∗) = 156.25 and GMFR(Q∗, r∗) = 1093.75.
However, if for example, the retailer deviates from the proposed objective
function and maximises
L′RFR(Q1, r1) = GRFR(Q1, r1)− L(r1, r2, Q1, Q2)/2 (10)
instead of LRFR(Q1, r1), this results in Q
∗ = 41.07, r∗ = 9.78, GRFR(Q∗, r∗) =
265.86 and GMFR(Q
∗, r∗) = 944.27. In such a way, the retailer can increase its
expected profit, while decreases the total supply chain profit, thus corrupts
coordination.
Such manipulations in distributed optimization problems are widely stud-
ied in the distributed mechanism design literature (for some basic definitions,
see e.g., Parkes and Shneidman, 2004).
3. Conclusions
In this paper we discussed the ADM-based supply chain coordination
method and pointed out that it only works with benevolent participants; a
profit maximising retailer or manufacturer can distort the desirable properties
of distributed optimisation algorithms. We proposed considering instruments
of distributed mechanism design for supply chain coordination problems with
self-interested retailer and manufacturer as possible future work.
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